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Indiana Central University
Spinoza's unrelenting emphasis on determinism and necessity seems, at first glance, incompatible with his espousal of human freedom. In what follows, I explicate Spinoza's meaning of the term "freedom" and argue that hi8 use of the term is compatible with his theses of determinism and necessity.
I conclude by noting some problems that Spinoza's determinism poses for his moral theory.
Spinoza's "Denial" of Freedom
Spinoza does reject some meanings of the term freedom. He repudiates the idea of "free choice."
(By "free choice" I mean the possibility that a man could have chosen to act other than he actually did.) He further dismisses any account of "will" or "desire" that would support a credible account of free choice.
For Spinoza, nature admits of no contingency, caprice, or indeterminateness.
In fact, man's very idea of free choice is the illusory result of inadequate knowledge.
"(M]en believe themselves to be free," he writes, "simply because they are conscious of their actions, and unconscious of the causes whereby those actions are determined.
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Man is limited by the confused perception that characterizes inadequate knowledge and, hence, delusively ascribes the adjective "free" .to an alleged phenomenon of "choice." According to Spinoza, humans fail to recognize that acts of choice are caused and subsequently imagine "themselves free inasmuch as they are conscious of [their] volitions and desires," but they "never even dream, in their ignorance, of the causes which have disposed them to wish and desire." 2 Spinoza disagrees with those who assert that "human actions depend on the will," since "this is a mere phrase without any idea to correspond thereto." 1 Much like the intellect, the will is merely "a particular mode of thinking."
Whether the will is conceived as finite or infinite, it too "requires a cause by which it should be conditioned to exist and act."* Moreover, the will is related to God because "it must be conditioned by God I Prop, xxix] to exist and act in a particular manner."* Explaining human action in terms of the will illustrates our ignorance; Will is externally caused and in no way can it adequately support the idea of "free choice"; the will is determined to exist and act only by God. Thus, Spinoza clearly opposes any conception of "freedom" as tantamount to being uncaused or indeterminate.
Rather, causes determine the will and, hence, human behavior can be considered neither capricious nor accidental. Correspondingly, since "decision" is simultaneous with a determined state, it is not a free cause. So decision also fails to sufficiently account for the idea of "free choice."
In conclusion, then, Spinoza allows for no "free choice"; the scope of necessity is universal. Necessity precludes the possibility of "free choice," whether conceived under the rubric of God, Spinoza's all-inclusive substance (Deus save Natura), comprises the universe, and each "mental" or "physical" event of experience follows necessarily from this one substance. Thus it is apparent that "the actual being of ideas owns God as its cause," and "the ideas of both the attributes of God and particular things" have, as their efficient cause, God himself, "insofar as he is a thinking thing." 3 ' Perhaps an example will help to clarify this applicability.
Spinoza and Cause
Consider the activity of building a house. Spinoza states that a cause referred to as final is "nothing else but human desire . . . ." For instance, "when we say that to be inhabited is the final cause of this or that house, we mean nothing more than that'a man . . . had a desire to build a house.
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The specific desire, that of "the being inhabited", is really the efficient cause."
2 ' An amplification of the term "desire" will illumine how efficient causality relates to the mental mode.
An appetite is an endeavor "when referred to mind and body in conjunction." 1 ' Desire is defined as "appetite with consciousness thereof." 2 ' Desire, then, is an efficient cause and is an appetite with consiousness appended. Consciousness clearly concerns the mental mode of experience; thus efficient causality applies to the mental mode of experience. Spinoza's example, the activity of building a house, illustrates that efficient causality pertains to both the physical and mental aspects of experience.
Man's Conatus
Spinoza states that "everything insofar as it is in itself, endeavors to persist in its own being."
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Conatus, then, is the self-preserving effort of particular things. In this endeavor, a thing resists that which "could take away its existence."
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In short, conatus is "the actual essence of the thing in question.
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The tendency toward self-preservation is present in and comprises the very definition of particular things, for Spinoza.
Generally speaking, conatus is also a theory that concerns the interaction of things. Mote that a particular thing is, for Spinoza, that which has a conditioned, finite existence. Under this endeavor, "each particular thing within the universe, by the eternal necessity of the nature of the universe as a whole of what it is a part, strives to maintain its existence." 1 * Nature, then, is comprised of individual modes that constantly endeavor to maintain themselves and, in so doing, interact with different particular modes that affect them.
Conatus applies to the attributes of both extension and thought.
An obvious parallel can here be observed: continuance or resistance in movement is the expression of the body's conatus. Continuance in thought represents the mind's conatus. Finally, the mind strives to affirm the existence of the body, since any idea negating the body's existence "cannot be postualted in our mind, but is contrary thereto."" When conatus refers to the mind alone, the endeavor is called "will. ' 
Man in Bondage or Constraint
That which follows from external causes, where man is passive, is constrained rather than free. Spinoza states that constraint occurs when something "is determined by something external to itself to a fixed and definite method of existence or action."* 1 One can be bound, then, when constrained by the action of another individual.
Man is but a partial cause, concerning that which follows from his nature externally. Hence bondage is, for Spinoza, equivalent to inadequate causality and represents the absence of freedom.
Man as Active and Free
Those acts which follow from adequate causes are neither compelled nor constrained from without. When man is the adequate causal agent of his actions, then he is free.
Individuals are "active" according to Spinoza, when they are the authors (causes) of their own actions. To the extent that an individual is active-the adequate cause of his own actions-that individual is free. Here we see that freedom, activity, and causal agency are compatible terms.
How can we free ourselves from the constraint of passion and bondage? The determination that characterizes reason or adequate knowledge can release us from the yoke of passion. More narrowly, we can modify and transform confused ideas and passions (like a particular emotion) through self-conscious reflection.
Spinoza
states that "an emotion, which is a passion, ceases to be a passion, as soon as we form a clear and distinct idea thereof."*' Now any emotion that Spinoza calls a passion is also a confused idea. When "we form a clear and distinct idea of a given emotion . 
